

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05

BIB-01 /088 W

----- 074038

P R 161740Z MAY 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0986

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0218

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NAC MINISTERS

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT ON CURRENT  
STATUS OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE SENT TO THE NAC FOR  
THE FORTHCOMING NATO MINISTERIAL AND SUMMIT MEETINGS.  
IT WAS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP ON MAY 16, 1975.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. THIS REPORT OF THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE VIENNA  
NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS  
ANALYZES THE PRESENT STATE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND  
COMMENTS ON FUTURE PROSPECTS.

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CONCLUSIONS

2. IN ITS NOVEMBER 28, 1974 REPORT TO NAC, THE AD HOC GROUP DESCRIBED TWO POSSIBLE COURSES OF FUTURE ACTION:

A. ON THE ONE HAND, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA COULD CONTINUE TO ELABORATE DETAILS OF THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION WHILE MAINTAINING ITS SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS. THE GROUP CONSIDERS THAT, IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THIS COURSE HOLDS OUT LITTLE PROSPECT FOR MAKING MUCH PROGRESS IN VIENNA TOWARDS AGREED ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS. NONE-THELESS, ADOPTION OF THIS APPROACH MIGHT BE JUSTIFIED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE RELATING TO SALT AND CSCE.

B. AN ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF ACTION COULD BE TO ADD FURTHER ELEMENTS TO THE ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR WESTERN REDUCTIONS AS AN INDUCEMENT TO THE EAST TO ACCEPT THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS. THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT, EVEN IF THIS WERE DONE, IT WOULD EVOKE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE FROM THE EAST. BUT UNTIL IT HAS BEEN TRIED THOROUGHLY, THE ALLIES WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO EVALUATE TO WHAT EXTENT THE EASTERN RESISTANCE TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSALS IS GENUINELY BASED ON AN EASTERN VIEW THAT THE REDUCTIONS IN NATO FORCES WHICH THE WEST IS NOW OFFERING ARE TOO SMALL TO COMPENSATE FOR THE WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS ASKED BY THE WEST.

3. THIS ANALYSIS REMAINS VALID AND HAS BEEN REINFORCED BY THE SUBSEQUENT COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

#### SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS

4. DURING THE PERIOD OF THIS REPORT, JANUARY - MAY 1975, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUED TO STRESS THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND TO CRITICIZE THE EAST FOR THEIR REFUSAL TO DISCUSS THE FACTS RELATING TO THE SIZE OF THE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES IN THE AREA. AT THE END OF THE PERIOD, EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES INFORMALLY INDICATED POSSIBLE WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS DEFINITIONS OF FORCES AND DATA IN THE NEXT NEGOTIATING ROUND, BUT

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IT IS TOO SOON TO TELL WHAT THEIR INTENTIONS ARE.

5. DURING THE LAST ROUND OF NEGOTIATION, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES DEVELOPED A NEW, ADDITIONAL LINE OF ARGUMENTATION FOR WESTERN POSITIONS, WHICH THEMSELVES REMAINED UNCHANGED IN SUBSTANCE. THE ALLIES ASSERTED THAT, IN CONSIDERING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF POTENTIAL AGREEMENTS, PARTICIPANTS MUST EVALUATE THE TOTAL EFFECTS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT ON THEIR

SECURITY. THEY STRESSED THAT IT IS MISLEADING TO CONSIDER ONLY THE SIZE OF THE REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE TWO SIDES; ONE MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE CONTINUING FORCE LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM AN AGREEMENT AND THE EFFECTS ON STABILITY IN THE AREA OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS. THEY POINTED OUT THAT THE EAST WILL GAIN MORE THAN THE WEST FROM RESIDUAL FORCE LIMITATIONS RESULTING FROM ANY AGREEMENT. THIS IS BECAUSE THE TOTAL SIZE OF WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WILL BE REDUCED AND LIMITED, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS DIRECTLY ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WILL HAVE NO LIMIT ON THE TOTAL SIZE OF ITS FORCES. THE TOTAL SIZE OF US FORCES ALSO WILL NOT BE LIMITED, BUT TO REACH THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, WITHDRAWN US FORCES OR REINFORCEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO BE MOVED 5,000 KILOMETERS BY AIR OR SEA.

6. IT IS THE GROUP'S EVALUATION THAT, EVEN WITH IMPROVED ARGUMENTATION, THERE IS NO APPARENT PROSPECT OF REACHING AGREEMENT IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF ELABORATING DETAILS OF THE PRESENT WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSALS. SO FAR, THE EAST HAS SHOWN NO INCLINATION TO ACCEPT SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, WHICH CALLS FOR FIRST PHASE WITHDRAWAL OF 29,000 US SOLDIERS WITHOUT HEAVY EQUIPMENT, IN RETURN FOR WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY OF FIVE DIVISIONS, INCLUDING 68,000 SOLDIERS AND 1,700 TANKS, AND AN EASTERN COMMITMENT TO REDUCE IN A SECOND PHASE TO A COMMON CEILING IN OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

7. FOR ITS PART, THE EAST HAS MADE REPEATED EFFORTS TO GAIN ACCEPTANCE OF ITS ORIGINAL REDUCTION APPROACH, WHICH CALLS FOR AN APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT REDUCTION, STAGED OVER A THREE-YEAR PERIOD, OF EVERY DIRECT PARTICIPANT'S

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GROUND, AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS EASTERN APPROACH WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE THE PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS. IN PRESSING FOR ACCEPTANCE OF THIS APPROACH, THE EAST HAS SOUGHT TO EVOKE THE APPEARANCE OF FLEXIBILITY WITH REGARD TO THE ALLIED TWO-PHASE PROGRAM OF NEGOTIATION BY DIVIDING THE FIRST TWO STAGES OF THE ORIGINAL EASTERN PROPOSAL INTO TWO SUB-STAGES OF IMPLEMENTATION. DOING THIS WOULD ENABLE THE US AND USSR TO IMPLEMENT PREVIOUSLY AGREED REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST SUB-STAGE AND REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO TAKE THEIR REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND SUB-STAGE IN TWO SUCCESSIVE YEARS. BUT EACH STAGE OF THE EASTERN PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE FOR THE SAME EQUAL-NUMBER OR EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS AS THE ORIGINAL EASTERN PROPOSAL, AND THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE

IN THE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSAL.

8. IN THE PAST ROUND, THE EAST ALSO PRESSED FOR WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF ITS PROPOSAL THAT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNDERTAKE NOT TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND AGAIN SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER A SMALL INITIAL REDUCTION SEPARATE FROM ITS ORIGINAL PROGRAM. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES MAINTAINED THEIR STRONG DEMANDS FOR REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES AND FOR REDUCTION COMMITMENTS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET, BEFORE ANY REDUCTIONS TAKE PLACE.

9. A PRINCIPAL EASTERN OBJECTIVE AT THIS POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS STILL APPEARS TO BE SMALL SYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS INVOLVING ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WHICH IN PRACTICE WOULD FREEZE THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA AS WELL AS THE RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS OF EACH PARTICIPANT. SIMILARLY, THE EASTERN PROPOSAL THAT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS UNDERTAKE NOT TO INCREASE EXISTING LEVELS OF THEIR FORCES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD GIVE THE EAST MANY OF THE LIMITATIONS ON NATO FORCES WHICH IT COULD ACHIEVE THROUGH A FORCE REDUCTION AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE COMPENSATING ADVANTAGES THE WEST IS SEEKING IN ITS REDUCTION PROPOSALS.

10. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES IN VIENNA SO FAR HAVE BEEN  
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UNABLE TO MOVE THE EAST AWAY FROM THIS RESTRICTED APPROACH AND INTO A SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENT WESTERN REDUCTION PROGRAM. END TEXT.RESOR

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TEXT, NEGOTIATIONS, MEETING REPORTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 16 MAY 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975MBFRV00218  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D750174-0113  
**From:** MBFR VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
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**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t19750545/aaaabopv.tel  
**Line Count:** 204  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 01 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <01 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <24 JUL 2003 by GarlanWA>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP REPORT TO NAC MINISTERS FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AD HOC GROUP REPORT ON CURRENT  
**TAGS:** PARM, MARR, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE DOD  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006